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Abstract
The dynamics of self-conﬁdence are modelled in an environment where ra-
tional individuals optimally choose educations and occupations with the aim
to acquire productive skills while learning about ability. It is shown how the
presence of uninformative options can trap individuals below their potential.
Furthermore, the trade-oﬀ between probability of success and value of skills
may induce uncertain individuals to acquire less productive skills on their way
to ability intensive occupations. The value of information also induces un-
certain individuals to delay their labor market entry. The model can explain
diﬀerences in perseverance in the face of failure.
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11 Introduction
Many of us regret having missed some opportunity because we at the time successfully
convinced ourselves that it was no use even trying or because we decided a not so
challenging path was good enough for us. Regret is there because we know that of
those who grabbed the chance and succeeded some had, in our view, no objective
reason to believe they were better suited than we were ourselves. The purpose of
this paper is to show how this phenomenon which we shall call negative self-selection
can arise when individuals are fully rational but have uncertain perceptions of ability,
i.e. when individuals lack self-conﬁdence.1 We further suggest that social and gender
diﬀerences in ability perceptions through such a mechanism have a role in explaining
diﬀerences in educational and labor market choices and attainment.
Family background and gender diﬀerences in educational and labor market choices
and attainment are well documented.2 Altonji and Blank(1999) state that gaps tend
to persist, albeit at a lower level, in spite of massive educational expansion, public
funding of schooling, increased labor market participation of women and laws against
discrimination. Explanations for gaps in labor market attainment have typically
been sought in diﬀerences of preferences, various forms of discrimination in the case
of gender gaps, and in imperfect capital markets in the case of social gaps.3
1We use the term self-conﬁdence to capture the mean (self-image) and variance (precision=
1/variance) of the individual’s perception about his endowment of ability for a given task. There is
an abundance of concepts of self in the psychological literature. Bandura’s self-eﬃcacy concept is
fairly close to our own. See Bandura (1977) and Baumeister (1999).
2E.g. Haveman and Wolfe 1995, Altonji and Blank 1999 and Solon 1999 and Blackaby and Frank
(2000), Booth and Burton with Mumford (2000), Altonji and Blank (1999), Kolpin and Singell
(1996), and Erikson and Jonsson (1996).
3See Altonji and Blank (1999) and Mulligan(1997) for reviews of diﬀerent explanations, and-
Lundberg and Startz (1998) for a review of the discrimination literature.
2The presence of family background and gender inﬂuences on individuals’ self-
perceptions documented in Baumeister(1999), Frieze et al (1978), Gecas (1989), and
Pulford and Coleman (1997), provide fuel for an additional approach to understand-
ing social and gender diﬀerences labor market attainment and behavior. We shall
argue that diﬀerences in self-perceptions, and in particular in the degree of ability
uncertainty, can provide a uniﬁed explanation for some empirical patterns that have
previously typically been interpreted as results of discrimination or resource con-
straints as well as some other empirical ﬁndings brought into focus in this paper that
do not ﬁnd straightforward interpretation in the previous literature. The empirical
patterns we aim to explain are captured by the words, trapped, delayed, handicapped
and stubborn.
1) We show in section 2 that there is a non-trivial overlap in the ability distrib-
utions of Swedish university graduates and non-university graduates. This indicates
that there are a number of potential university talents who could have made it had
they only tried. These are candidates of people trapped below their potential. More-
over, Svensson (1997) presents evidence that educational choices diﬀer by family
background and gender for given high school grades and other measures of ability,
indicating social and gender gaps in the risk of being trapped.4
2) We also show evidence, in section 2 below, of that Swedish men (women)
graduating from female (male) dominated university educations do so at a higher
age than their female (male) colleagues. They are delayed. A similar delay pattern
is presented for Swedish university freshmen, where low parental education implies
delayed university entry.
3) Singell, McDowell and Ziliac (2000) partly explain lower female research pro-
4In particular, Svensson’s results indicate that girls and/or children from less privileged back-
ground require stronger signals on ability in order to opt for higher education.
3ductivity, measured in terms of publications, by a female tendency to have acquired
less hard core or ability intensive skills. They are in a sense handicapped by the
choices they made along their career path.
4) Gustafsson et al (2000) presents evidence that Swedish children from working
class background who fail their SATs tend to give up the idea of higher education,
while children of well educated parents with the same test results are more stubborn,
i.e. take the test over and over until they get results good enough to be admitted to
university.5
In studies on US data, Monk (1997) and Light (1995) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on wages of delayed college studies. This suggests that there is a connection
between delay and handicap. Interestingly, Light (1995) concludes that her ﬁnding
of lower wages due to delay cannot be explained as a consequence of that delayed
individuals are drawn from the bottom end of the ability distribution, nor does she
ﬁnd that individuals who re-enroll do so because they have experienced negative wage
shocks or that they are delayed because of ﬁnancial constraints.
In order to understand why some people give up a career before they have tried,
some take time before they commence their studies, some avoid challenging options
even if they have good grades while others stubbornly persist when they have failed,
we model the career choice of a rational, but uncertain individual.6
Consider an agent who is about to make her career choice. She does not know her
ability.7 She has to decide what skills to acquire by choosing between diﬀerent options
5The evidence refers to results from Swedish SAT’s in the 1990’s. These SAT’s can be taken
by anyone who wants to qualify for university. The SAT’s serve as a substitute for a high school
diploma or a diploma with insuﬃcient grades.
6A similar choice situation is modelled in Weinberg (2000). Weinberg, however, considers a one
period framework and assumes that self-perceptions enter the utility function directly.
7The reason for not knowing are left out of this analysis, but absence of role models is a candidate.
4where her probability of success depends on how able she is. Being successful results
in productive skills, while success as well as failure reveal information about ability.
While, failure will induce her to pick less ability intensive and revealing options,
success will make her opt for more and more ability intensive options. Self-selection
of task diﬃculty, hence, implies that success speeds up (slows down) learning one is
able (not so able), whereas failure slows down (speed up) learning one is able (not so
able), compared to an environment where choices do not aﬀect the informativeness
of the signals one receives.
The mechanism at play is that the more uncertain the agent is about her ability
the more will her perception of ability be aﬀected by the signals of success and failure.
If she receives numerous positive signals not only will she start to believe she is able,
she will also be increasingly sure that she is.
In such an environment, ability uncertainty and bad luck implies that an individual
can be trapped below his potential without knowing it. The uncertain individual also
risks not reaching his full potential, because he has acquired too little skills, even in
t h ec a s ew h e nh eﬁnally realizes his ability and ends up in the appropriate option. We
shall refer to these two risks of unrealized potential due to negative self-selection as the
trap of ignorance and the handicap of uncertainty.8 Ability uncertainty also creates
costs related to positive self-selection since the option value of risky alternatives can
cause individuals to experience frequent failures and end up with limited skills.
Models similar to ours are presented in Breen (1999), and Breen and García-
Peñalosa (2002). Breen emphasizes socially determined diﬀerences in perceptions
8The symptoms of the trap of ignorance bare similarities to what psychologists call inaction
inertia. The mechanisms are however diﬀerent since inaction inertia is a result of that the individual
does not want to alter his behavior (doing nothing) since this would imply that he had to admit to
making the wrong choice of behavior previously. See Tykocinsky, Pittman & Tuttle (1995).
5regarding the relative importance of ability vs eﬀort in succeeding in education where
individuals from disadvantaged background are typically stuck with the self-fulﬁlling
belief that eﬀort does not matter. However, while Breen’s model gives an understand-
ing of diﬀerent educational attainments it does not capture why some individuals who
have obviously worked hard and achieved high grades still do not go on to higher ed-
ucation. In order to explain this we introduce uncertainty about ability.
Our model of self-conﬁdence, or perception of ability, is based on the same fun-
damental hypotheses as the model due to Benabou and Tirole (2000,2001), namely
1) imperfect information about ability; and 2) Bayesian updating of the individual’s
perception of ability and probability of success.
An important diﬀerence in a dynamic context is that we decompose self-conﬁdence
into two parts: (i) self-image - which is the individual’s beliefs about his ability and,
(ii) precision - which captures how certain the individual is in his self-image.9 As
a result, a person can be very self-conﬁdent in the sense of being certain, without
believing himself to be a genius. Similarly a person can lack self-conﬁdence (in the
sense of being uncertain about his ability) and still have a high perceived probability
of success.10
The point we make is that the more certain the individual, the less will he adjust
his self-image as a result of success or failure and hence, the more likely he is to
persevere in his original choice of career path.11 Also the nature of the task matters
9Benabou and Tirole also deﬁne self- conﬁdence and one’s distribution over one’s true ability, but
ability in their model is synonymous to the probability of succeeding in a given task. In our model
the probability of succeeding is a function of ability.
10In Benabou and Tirole, an individual is more self-conﬁd e n tt h em o r ec l e v e rh et h i n k sh ei s .
However, our deﬁnition of being relatively more self-conﬁdent coincides with theirs in the particular
case where two individuals are equally uncertain (or conﬁdent) but have diﬀerent self-image.
11An alternative explanation for perseverance in decision making is found in Prendergast and Stole
6for how self-image is updated. If a task is so complex that even the brightest face
a substantial risk of failing, then success will boost self-image while failure will have
less inﬂuence on self-image. If, on the other hand, the task is so simple that very little
ability is suﬃcient to almost guarantee not failing, then success will have little impact
on self-conﬁdence while failure will have a large negative impact on self-image.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present empirical evidence of the phenomena
we wish to explain in section 2. In section 3, we outline a career choice model and in
section 4 we show the consequences for behavior and outcomes of self-conﬁdence and
its dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Observations
This section presents data on the types of educational choice patterns and behaviors
this paper attempts to model. Our hypothesis is that these patterns can be the result
of rational choice behavior of individuals or groups of individuals who have diﬀerent
degrees of uncertainty with regard to their own ability, i.e. who diﬀer in terms of
self-conﬁdence. The data are taken from the ”Evaluation through follow-up” (UGU)
survey of Swedish school kids born in 1953 and from Statistics Sweden. The ability
test scores reported are results from ability tests performed at age 12.12
(1996). In their model, individuals signal that they are well informed by sticking to past decisions.
However, their mechanism cannot explain the perseverance of students trying to obtain an SAT
s c o r eh i g he n o u g ht og e ta c c e p t e da tu n i v e r s i t y .
12A description of the data and variable deﬁnitions are found in the appendix.
72.1 Trapped and ignorant
The verbal ability distributions for university graduates and individuals without uni-
versity education, non-graduates in ﬁgures 1 and 2, show that while Swedish university
graduates constitute a selected group, the ability distribution of the non-university
educated is close to normal. The large overlap in ability distribution indicates that
there are a number of potential university talents who could have made it had they
only tried.
Verbal Ability of Swedish University Graduates




































T h ea r g u m e n ti nt h i sp a p e rr e s t so nt h a ta tl e a s ts o m eo ft h e s ep o t e n t i a lu n i v e r s i t y
talents opted out because they did not believe they would make it. There may of
course be other reasons for not choosing university education. Lack of other necessary
abilities, lack of self-dicipline or simply having other intrerests in life are but a few.
However, the basic point remains intact if we try to control for some of these reasons.
Figure 3 attempts to control for the lack of other necessary abilities by instead,
8Verbal Ability of Swedish Non-University Graduates
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Figure 3:
9looking at the individual’s minimum ability score - i.e. the minimum of the individuals
scores from verbal, spacial and logical ability tests.13 We also attempt to control for
possible diﬀerences in self-discipline and school interest by restricting the sample to
those who received top marks in the core subjects maths and Swedish in grade 6 (age
12). Furthermore, the sample in Figure 3 is restricted to individuals who graduated
from a theoretical, university preparing high school program (THP) in order to further
control for interest in theoretical subjects and higher studies.
The ability distribution of the non-graduates is no longer normal, but rather
positively scewed, as is the distribution if the university graduates. Importantly, the
overlap remains and it is not straigh forward to tell the distrubutions apart.
Figures 4 and 5 show that even in this very select group of students, i.e. top
grade, THP graduates, the proportion of students going on to university, for a given
minimum ability score, diﬀers between male and female students and according to
the educational attainment of the parents.
A reason for the diﬀerences in proportion pursuing a university degree may be
resource constraints. Although this can hardly explain the gender diﬀerence, it could
be part of the story in relating diﬀerences in choices to the educational attainment of
the parents. However, free tuition and the generous and accessible state subsidized
loans available to Swedish students since the early 1960, cast doubt on whether credit
constraints are actually present. Willingness to loan ﬁnance studies may, however,
diﬀer across social groups, but this is again something which could have its reasons
in diﬀerences in the perception of the risks involved in persuing a university degree.
A reason for of such diﬀerences in risk perceptions, we would argue, are diﬀerences
in ability uncertainty.
13See deﬁnition in the appendix
10Proportion of University graduates among top grade THGs by gender and minimum ability test score















Proportion of University graduates among top grade THGs by parental education and minimum ability test score
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Figure 5:
112.2 Delayed
The age distributions at graduation of male and female students in male and female
dominated university educations, and the distribution of parental background of uni-
versity freshmen in ﬁgures 6,7, and 8 indicate that people are delayed when they
enter careers in which they have reason to have relatively little knowledge of their
ability. This paper presents two reasons for why uncertain individuals are delayed,
both related to the incentive to test ones abilities.
First, delay into a risky career option may be caused by the individuals’ incentive
to ﬁnd out about ability in a moderately risky alternative before daring to opt for a
risky unfamiliar alterative. Second, delayed entry into a moderately risky or fairly
safe career option may be caused by the individual’s failed attempt to pursue a risky
career alternative. To the extent that the test score averages of individuals in male
and female dominate university educations, presented in the appendix, reﬂect how
male and female dominated career options diﬀer with respect to how ability intensive
they are, we would expect the ﬁrst explanation to be more prevalent for female delay
and the second more valid for male delays.
Figure 6 shows that the delay of men in female dominated university educations
is particularly strong. A year of this delay could be explained by the fact that most
of these Swedish men were subjected to roughly a year’s compulsory military service,
but even taking a year oﬀ their graduation age would not change the pattern.
The military service year would make the female delay pattern in Figure 7 more
pronounced. A possible explanation for the wider dispersion for both men and women
in the female dominated ﬁelds is that these are relatively low paying ﬁelds in which
the opportunity cost of stying on another year is not as pronounced.
In Figure 8, the average age of university freshmen between 1990 and 1998 shows
12Age Distribution at Graduation. Female Dominated University Educations




































a pattern which can be interpreted in an analogous fashion. Compare the relative
frequency distribution across parental education categories of freshmen of ages less
than 21 (the black bars) to the relative frequency distribution of freshmen aged 25-34
(the light gray bars). It is clear that the young freshmen typically have well educated
parents, while the old freshmen have less educated parents.
The reason, proposed in this paper, why students from educationally disadvan-
taged families are delayed in their decision to go to university is that they have
relatively little knowledge about their academic abilities. However, here there are nu-
merous reasons to be cautious! Since we have no possibility of controlling for ability
and grades in this table, a potential explanation is that low educated background is
associated with poorer grades, making it more prevalent for such students to take
advantage of the possibility oﬀered by Swedish universities to be admitted on a quota
where work experience grants qualifying credentials. Furthermore, to the extent that
13Age Distribution at Graduation. Male Dominated University Educations




































low parental education means being poor could also aﬀect the delay pattern. How-
ever, the eﬀects could pull in diﬀerent directions.14 Scarcity of resources increase
the opportunity cost of education - which would tend to increase the incentive to
ﬁnish early in order to maximize the pay back time, given that the individual de-
c i d e so na ne d u c a t i o ni nt h eﬁrst place, while credit market imperfections may cause
poor students delay their studies in order to save ﬁrst, or pursue part-time studies
while working themselves through university thus delaying their graduation. Given
that student loans are readily available in Sweden, the ﬁrst eﬀect is more likely to
dominate.
14See Monk (1997), Jacoby (1994), and Light (1994).
14 Distribution of university freshmen by parental education and age group
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Figure 8:
3T h e M o d e l
We present a two period career choice model. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period
i n d i v i d u a l sc h o o s ew h a tt y p eo fs k i l l st oa c q u i r e .A tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o dt h e yh a v e
either succeeded or not in acquiring the skills which leads them to update their prior
beliefs about their ability. In the beginning of the second period the individual chooses
a career (or an occupation) in which to work and earn a living. Second period, and
hence lifetime, income depends on success on the job and on skills acquired in school.
3.1 Period one - school
Consider an individual faced with the following options. The individual can go to
school to acquire
1. R - highly advanced skills (risky option),
152. M - advanced skills (moderate option),
3. O - general skills (outside option).
Let the individual’s ability be a ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore, let the probability of
successfully acquiring skills in the diﬀerent options C1 ∈ {R,M,O} at t =1 , be
PC1(a)=ac1, where c1 ∈ {r1,m 1,0} in the risky, moderate and outside option respec-
tively and where r1 >m 1 > 0.15 The outside option is an option in which success
does not depend on ability. The probability of success in the outside option is per-
fectly inelastic. If successful in school, the individual acquires skills which add hC
to working life productivity.16 A necessary condition for all options to be considered
is that hR >h M >h O, i.e. skills that are harder to acquire are more productive.
Failure at t implies that the individual gained no incremental skills at that t.
Assuming risk neutrality and that earnings are fully determined by productivity,
the expected addition to working life productivity is what matters for individual
choices. The expected value of skills, i.e. the addition to working life productivity
acquired if option C1 is chosen is:
E[HC1]=PC1(a)hC1. (1)
Further assuming that advanced skills are preferred to less advanced if they give at
least as high expected addition to productivity, an individual who is fully informed
of his ability would make the following choices:
• the risky if a ≥ a,
• t h em o d e r a t ei fa ∈ [a,a),
15The parameter c in ac is (1 − (the ability elasticity of success)).
16We assume that this is the only eﬀect of skills, hence, excluding that skills may also inﬂuence
the probability of being successful in the future.

















Assume instead that the individual does not know his ability, but that the indi-
vidual has a prior distribution over ability with continuous density ρ0(a), and support





Hence, in order for the individual to prefer option I to option J when i>j ,the









If i<j ,strict inequality is required. The individual is trading oﬀ the probability of
successfully acquiring skills to acquiring skills of higher productive value. If ρ0(a) is







It will prove useful to introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Prior Indiﬀerence) An individual who has received no informa-
tion has a uniform prior and is indiﬀerent between the three options if E[HR]=
hR/(1 + r)=E[HM]=hM/(1 + m)=E[HO]=hO.
This assumption allows us to focus our attention on: (i) the implications of dy-
namic considerations, and (ii) how the relative ability sensitivity between diﬀerent
17options r,m inﬂuences choices when higher risk is exactly compensated for by higher
productivity.
The eﬀect of uncertainty in general on the expected returns in diﬀerent options
depends on the parameter c.
Proposition 1 Uncertainty about ability makes options more/less attractive if the
probability of success is PC(a)=ac and c is greater/smaller than 1.
Proof. The perceived probability of success in option C for an uncertain individ-














2c if c ≷ 1. (7)
Thus uncertainty makes risky options more attractive if there are increasing mar-
ginal returns to ability. Note that uncertainty can aﬀect the relative attractiveness of
options. E.g. an individual who would prefer the moderate option in the absence of
uncertainty, could be inclined to go for the risky option in the presence of uncertainty.
Using Assumption 1 and assuming ho =1 , one can illustrate this point in a dia-
gram in r,m−space. For these parameter values the cut-oﬀ abilities for an individual





r−m and a = 1
(1+m)
1
m. This implies that if ability is
known to be a =1 /2, then a<a and the individual prefers the moderate option for
parameter ranges corresponding to the white area in Figure 9. The outside option
would be preferred in the light gray area and the risky option in the medium gray










Figure 9: Optimal choices when a =1 /2.
3.2 Period two - working life
We model productivity, and hence earnings, in working life as either fully determined
by skills acquired in school in period one or as determined by the skills acquired in
school and on successfully learning skills in a chosen occupation. The probability of
successfully learning on the job is assumed to depend on ability only.17
If working life productivity is determined by skills acquired in school, no choices
are made in period two and the model reduces to the myopic one period choice
model with T =1 . If, on the other hand, productivity in working life depends both
17Allowing skills acquired in school to inﬂuence the probability of learning on the job would
complicate the model.
19on previously acquired skills and on being successful in a chosen occupation, then
the choice of occupation is of course also of importance and we have a two period,
sequential skill accumulation model , T =2 . Skills are transferrable, which implies
that successfully acquired skill from any option at t =1are productive at t =2
whether or not the individual is successful in his t =2choice.
Assume that there are three possible occupations in working life, C2 ∈ {R1,M 1,O 1},
just as there were in school, and that working life productivity, H is determined by
previously acquired skills HC1 and on successful on the job training in the chosen
occupation, E[HC2], such that:
E[H]=HC1 + E[HC2] (8)
where E[HC2]=PC2(a)hC2 is the expected present value of the productivity of skills
learned in occupation C2. PC2 is the probability of successfully learning on the job in
occupation C2, and hC2 is the value of skills learnt on the job in C2.18 Conditions for
optimal choice behavior of individuals who know their ability are analogous to the
conditions derived for schooling choices. Uncertain individuals have, however, had a
chance to learn something about their ability from their successes and failures while
in school. This new information causes them to update their ability prior and hence
aﬀects their perceived probability of success in diﬀerent job options.
The possibility of learning about ones ability from the experience of success and
failure will also be taken into consideration in the choice of option in period one.
Hence, the uncertain individual’s choice situation can be seen as choosing an option,
Ct in each period t given some prior information about ability. The outcome in each
period is either success or failure, and since success depends on ability, success and
18Hence, HC2, implicitly takes into account a discount factor. The more impatient are individuals,
the lower their HC2 relative to HC1.
20failure yield signals, yt ∈ {s,f}, which are informative of ability.
Denote the probability of receiving the signal y, conditional on ability, in option






PC1(a) if y = s
1 − PC1(a) if y = f.
(9)
Further, let the individual’s prior belief about his ability at time t =1be represented
by the density ρ0(a) with support [0,1]. After having observed y, beliefs are updated




0 gC1(y | a)ρ0(a)da
. (10)
When the young individual makes his ﬁr s tc h o i c eo fw h a ts k i l l st oa c c u m u l a t eh e
solves the following maximization problem:





ρ0(a)PC1(a)da + E[V2(ρ1) | y], where (11)
V2(ρ1)= m a x
C2∈{R,M,O}
E[HC2]
The individual thus has an incentive to acquire skills not only for their own sake, but
also because success may improve future self-perception and chosen career option.
To gain the self-conﬁdence to opt for a risky occupation it may be necessary for an
uncertain individual to have received a signal of success in a suﬃciently informative
option when acquiring skills. However, aiming high to begin with is accompanied with
the risk of failing to gain productive skills with subsequent low earnings whatever the
choice of occupation. Thus the individual faces a trade-oﬀ between probability of
gaining productive skills and a boost in self-image, and the level of productivity and
size of the boost.
Let us illustrate these points by solving the individual’s maximization problem
under Assumption 1 and assuming a uniform prior.
21First let us consider the eﬀect on the individual’s choice behavior from the ﬁrst




ρ1(a | y)PC2(a)da. (12)





(1 + c1)ac1 if y = s
c1+1
c1 (1 − ac1) if y = f.
(13)
For c1 > 0 success gives a boost in self-perception, and failure a blow. It is easily
veriﬁed that the boost is increasing in c whereas the blow is decreasing.
The expected value from choosing option C2 i nt h ec a s eo fs u c c e s si s
E[HC2 | s]=
(c1 +1 ) hC2
(c1 + c2 +1 )
=
(c1 + 1)(1 + c2)hO2
(c1 + c2 +1 )
, (14)
which is clearly increasing in c2, implying that expected period two gain in produc-
tivity is maximized when c∗
2 = r2 (i.e. as high as possible). Thus an individual who is
successful in either the risky or the moderate option in the ﬁrst period, opts for the
risky occupation in the second period, on the assumption of prior indiﬀerence. After
a boost in self-conﬁdence, the individual is no longer indiﬀerent.
By symmetry of the argument, failing in either the risky or the moderate option
implies that the uninformative option will be optimal. Here we have that
E[HC2 | f]=
hC2(c1 +1 )
(c2 +1 ) ( c1 + c2 +1 )
=
hO2(1 + c2)(c1 +1 )
(c2 +1 ) ( c1 + c2 +1 )
(15)
which is decreasing in c2. Hence, given failure, the expected value is clearly maximized
when c2 is as small as possible (i.e. the uninformative option).
Thus, if the individual has a uniform prior and is hence indiﬀerent between the
three options given T =1 , choice behavior in the second period if T =2will only
22be aﬀected by whether the individual is successful or not, and will not depend on
w h e t h e rh eg o e sf o rt h er i s k yo rt h em o d e r a t ei nt h eﬁrst period.
In the ﬁrst period the individual chooses the option that will maximize the ex-















It will prove useful to highlight an important aspect of the behavior of the uncertain
individual who has the opportunity to learn about ability in school before he makes
his occupational choice in a lemma, before we go on to characterize the conditions for
optimal choice behavior.
Lemma 1 (Information is valuable) The initially indiﬀerent individual, strictly
prefers an informative option in school when he has the opportunity to learn about
ability.
Proof. To see this, use Assumption 1 and deﬁne the information value, IC1, of
choosing C1 :
IC1 ≡ E[H | C1] − (hO1 + hO2)=
1












Where (hO1 + hO2) is the maximum expected productivity of an individual with
uniform prior who does not learn about ability. For any value of c1 > 0,I C1 is clearly
larger than zero.
Maximizing 16 is equivalent to picking the informative option which maximizes
the information value IC1. From the right-hand expression in 17, it is clear that the
individual faces a trade-oﬀ between probability of success, i, which decreases in c1, and
the magnitude of the boost in perceived probability of success, ii, which is increasing
in c1.
23Proposition 2 (The easy track) When the individual has an opportunity to learn
about ability, he will prefer the moderate (easy track) to the risky option (hard track)
if it is informative enough and if the future is not too ability intensive.
Proof. From 17 it is straight forward to derive the following condition:




It follows from this condition that individuals will prefer to start oﬀ in the mod-
erate option rather than the risky, provided that the moderate option is informative
enough.19 T h em o r er i s k yt h ef u t u r e ,t h eh i g h e ri sr2, the larger the returns to
information and, hence, the more informative need be the moderate option to be
preferred to the risky option at t =1 . The riskier is the risky option (the higher is
r1), the smaller is the demand on informativeness on the moderate option for it to be
preferred.
4E ﬀects of Self-Selection and the Dynamics of
Self-Conﬁdence
This section analyses the consequences for individual labor market behavior of the
outlined model of schooling and occupational choice of individuals who are uncertain
19This margin in (r − m)-space is shown as the gray line in Figures 11 under the assumption that
c1 = c2, and hO1 = hO2 =1 . It can be shown for c1 = c2 = c3 that the margin at which the individual
is indiﬀerent between the two informative options shifts to the advantage of the moderate option if
T is extended to 3. That is, further possibilities to acquire skills, makes it even more valuable to opt
for safer but less productive skills.
24about their ability, but who rationally update their perception of ability when they
succeed or fail in their endeavors.
4.1 Delay, handicap of uncertainty, and the trap of ignorance
Lemma 1 illustrates that the possibility of learning about ability in order to make
better future career decisions is obviously of value to the individual. An uncertain
individual, if given a choice would ex ante therefore prefer to sequentially gain skills
in two periods to having a one shot career choice situation.
Proposition 3 (Delay) Uncertain individuals prefer sequential to one shot career
decisions even if they are delayed if skills acquired in school are not too inferior to
skills acquired on the job.
Proof. Deﬁne a one shot career option as one which gives the possibility of
gaining 2hC2 if successful, which happens with probability ac2. The expected life time
productivity of an uncertain individual with uniform ability prior, maintaining the
indiﬀerence assumption, is hence E[Honeshot]=2 hO2. I tf o l l o w sf r o ml e m m a2t h a t
sequential skill accumulation gives ex ante expected productivity
E[Hsequential]=IC1 +( hO1 + hO2).
If E[Hsequential] exceeds E[Honeshot] then the individual would prefer a sequential career
decision even if this implied delayed labor market entry, i.e. if:
IC1 +( hO1 + hO2) > 2hO2,
which holds if
hO1 >h O2
(1 + c1)2 + r2
(1 + c1)2 +( 1+c1)r2
,
25where the second term on the RHS is clearly smaller than unity.
We would hence expect uncertain individuals to enter the labor market at a higher
age than certain individuals. This is exactly the pattern that was found for men
graduating from female dominated university educations.
Other consequences of uncertainty that follow directly from Proposition 2 and
Lemma 1 are what we call the handicaps of uncertainty. These capture the idea that
learning about ability is costly in terms of working life productivity precisely because
the individual trades oﬀ the probability of gaining skills and getting a boost in self-
conﬁdence against the amount of skills and magnitude of boost if successful. From
Proposition 2 it follows that:
Corollary 1 (Costly modesty) Uncertain individuals who reach the top via the
easy track have less productive skills than conﬁdent individuals.
To see this, compare the conﬁdent and uncertain individual who is successful at
the top. The conﬁdent will have productivity hR1 + hR2 >h M1 + hR2 which is the
productivity of the uncertain individual who took the easy track. The ﬁrst handicap
of uncertainty is the risk of unrealized potential of those, previously uncertain indi-
viduals who eventually end up in the option suitable for their ability, but who have
rationally taken the route via less demanding options and who have hence accumu-
lated less productive skills on the way. The condition determining when it is optimal
to take the easy track implies that there will be less risk of a productivity gap between
conﬁdent and uncertain individuals in occupations that are very demanding in terms
of ability (where r2 is high). Similarly there will be less of a gap if the ”hard track”
in school is in fact not so hard (r1 is low).20 From Lemma 1, it follows that:
20Preliminary analysis of Swedish UGU-data on earnings of graduates from male dominated univer-
sity educations indicate that the gender earnings gap declines as we go up the earnings distribution,
26Corollary 2 (Costly conceit) Uncertain individuals who end up at the bottom due
to failure in more diﬃcult options are less productive compared to conﬁdent individuals
in the safe option.
When there is only one period in which to learn about ability, learning is obviously
incomplete. This implies that there are two types of mistakes that an individual who
is uncertain about his ability at date 0 can make at date T.
1. Type I error: overplacement occurs when CT = R for a<a,o rCT = M for
a<a .
2. Type II error: underplacement occurs when CT = M,O for a ≥ a,o rCT = O
for a ≥ a.
If we consider a situation where the individual could gain productivity and knowl-
edge about ability throughout his lifetime, i.e. T →∞ , only underplacement errors
would occur with a positive probability due to the presence of an outside option.
This will be referred to as a trap of ignorance - the individual is trapped below his
p o t e n t i a lb e c a u s eh eh a sn o tf o u nd out how able he really is.
Proposition 4 (Trap of Ignorance) For all a ∈ (a,1) there exists a period t<∞
in which the individual will pick the outside option with a positive probability, and
stay there ever after.
Proof. T h e r ee x i s t saµt > 0 | Ct = O =a r g m a x Vt for t<∞. To see this,
suppose that the individual starts in the moderate option, and assume for convenience
that mt = m. The probability that he will fail t times in a row is (1−am)t,i nw h i c h
case his posterior will be
ρt =
(1 − am)tρ0 R 1
0 (1 − am)tρ0da
. (19)
Sjögren and Sällström (2004c).
27After these repeated failures his self-image is µt =
R 1
0 aρt(a)da.N o t et h a ti fh ea l w a y s
fails then limt→∞ µt → 0. Thus there exists a point in time prior to that event when
the individual prefers to switch to the outside option.
4.2 Stubbornness
S of a rw eh a v ef o c u s s e dt h ea n a l y s i st oe ﬀects of the opportunity to learn about ability
rather than on the process of learning itself, i.e. the dynamics of self-conﬁdence. These
dynamics are vital for understanding diﬀerences in perseverance or stubbornness.
Persevering in a career choice in the face of hardships and failure requires a large
portion of conﬁdence - or stability of self-image. In our terminology, perseverance in
the face of failure requires the individual’s variance of self-image to be small enough
f o raf a i l u r en o tt oc a u s eal a r g ee n o u g hb l o wt os e l f - c o n ﬁdence for the individual to
opt for an uninformative option. Likewise, a conﬁdent individual will not consider
success as strong a signal of ability as an uncertain individual. In the extreme, a
certain individual of course does not update his perception of ability at all in the face
of success and failure.
Consider two agents Perseveria and Rationella. Perseveria has had the chance to
gain conﬁdence earlier in life without changing the mean of her prior ability distri-
bution. In particular, assume Perseveria’s prior is the result of succeeding once and
failing once in two equivalent endeavours where the probability of success was a, hence
her ability prior ρ0P =6 ( a−a2). Rationella, on the other hand, has never attempted
anything and hence has a uniform prior on the unit interval. Hence, Perseveria’s
variance is smaller than Rationella’s. We know, from the previous section, what is
optimal behavior of Rationella’s in a two period situation, under the assumption of
prior indiﬀerence. If she succeeds in her period one choice she should go for the risky
28option in period two and if she fails she should opt for the safe outside option. We
also know that given her optimal behavior at t =2 , Rationella will opt for R at t=1,
unless M is informative enough. (See Proposition 2)
What about Perseveria? She is obviously not indiﬀerent in the T =1situation,
she would if T were 1, opt for the moderate option if it were concave in ability, m<1,
and the outside otherwise. To see this note that with this prior her expected payoﬀ








(2 + c1)(3 + c1)
hO1. (20)
This payoﬀ is higher than the outside option if c1 < 1, i.e. concave in ability, and
less than the outside option if c1 > 1, i.e. convex in ability. Perseveria would be
indiﬀerent between the outside and the moderate if m =1 , and strictly prefer them
to the risky. Similarly if Perseveria faced a world with only risky alternative options,
such as r>m>1, she would prefer the uninformative outside option, as opposed
to Rationella who is simply indiﬀerent. However, a forward looking Perseveria may
have an incentive to experiment, i.e. by choosing a costly but more informative
action in the ﬁrst period. The condition for doing this is that the information value
is substantial enough to compensate the lower expected payoﬀ at t =1 .
It is easily veriﬁed that if Perseveria receives strong signals, i.e, if she succeeds in
R or fails in M at t =1 ,h e rt =2choices will be as Rationella’s. However, because of
her smaller variance and her non-marginality, weak signals will aﬀect her diﬀerently.
Depending on the relation between r and m,f a i l i n gi nR will not necessarily make
Perseveria opt for the outside option, nor will succeeding in M, necessarily make her
opt for the risky option at t =2 . Figure 10 illustrates when this is the case under the
assumption that r1 = r2,m 1 = m2, hO1 =1 .
For r suﬃciently large, and m suﬃciently small, (above E[HM2 | fR1]=E[HO2 |















fR1]), Perseveria prefers M to O if she fails in the risky option if T =2 .T h er e a s o ni s
that failing in R,w h e nr is so large is only a very weak signal of inability, and hence
since the moderate option is not too demanding it will be preferred to the outside
option at t =2 .F o r m suﬃciently small relative to r, and r large enough, (above
E[HR2 | sM1]=E[HM2 | sM1]), success in M is not strong enough a signal of ability
to make Perseveria dare opt for R at t =2 , when she has succeeded in M at t =1 .
Instead she will opt for the less demanding M.
Will Rationella and Perseveria ever make the same t =1choice but end up in
diﬀerent options at t =2even if they receive the same signal at t =1 ? The answer
to this is yes.
The gray line in Figure 11 shows when Rationella is indiﬀerent between R and
M, i.e. when the information values of the options are equalized, IM = IR,g i v e n
prior indiﬀerence. Above, and to the right of the gray line, Rationella opts for the
M, below and to the left, Rationella opts for the R-option. The thin black lines from
Figure 10, show when Perseveria’s behavior is potentially diﬀerent from Rationella’s.
Only below the E[HR2 | sM1]=E[HM2 | sM1]−line, will Perseveria react in the same






















way to signals of success and failure as Rationella.
Perseveria’s t =1choice is shown by the thick black lines. Below, and to the left
of E[HR1]=E[HM1], Perseveria opts for the Risky option. Her reaction to success
and failure will be the same as Rationella’s except in the tiny range of r and m above
the E[HM2 | fR1]=E[HO2 | fR1]. In this area, ﬁr s tp e r i o dc h o i c ei st h es a m e ,b u t
Perseveria perseveres opts for the Moderate option if she fails, whereas Rationella
then goes for the outside option.
If the value of working life human capital is large relative to school human capital,
hO2 > 1, the area in which Perseveria perseveres is larger. The dashed line in ﬁgure
11 shows the margin at which perseveria is indiﬀerent between R and M if hO2 =1 .5.
Between the E[HR1]=E[HM1] and the E[HM1]=E[HO1], Perseveria opts for the
Moderate option at t =1 . Hence, above the gray line, Perseveria and Rationalla would
make the same ﬁrst period choice. While Rationella always goes for the risky when
she succeeds, Perseveria only does so for small values of r. For larger r, Perseveria
will instead opt for the moderate if she succeeds. We summarize the result of this
section as follows:
31Lemma 2 Smaller prior variance results in smaller boost/bust in self-image in case
of success/failure.
Proof. It is veriﬁed in the appendix that Perseveria’s self-image,
R 1
0 aρ1Pda after
success (failure) in C1 is lower (higher) than Rationella’s.
Proposition 5 (Stubbornness) Smaller prior variance leads to more persistent be-
havior when signals are weak.
Proof. Given Perseveria’s updated priors from Lemma 2 the solutions to the
equations E[HR1]=E[HM1] and E[HM1]=E[HO1] (in Fig 11) show that if r1 = r2,
m1 = m2, hO1 = hO2 =1 , there exist pairs (m,r), for which Rationella and Perseveria
opt for R (M) at t =1 , such that Perseveria’s optimal choice at t =2is M in the
event of failure (success).
It is interesting to note that perseverance depends not only on the variance of
the prior, but also on the informativeness of the signal received. The point is that
the smaller the variance of the ability prior, and the higher the probability of failing
for brilliant individuals, i.e. the larger is c, the smaller will be the blow to self-
perception of a failure. Conﬁdent enough individuals will, hence be able to endure
failures without being totally discouraged. At the same time, conﬁdent individuals
people can experience success without making large upward adjustments in their self-
perception, especially if the option they succeed has a high probability of success, (c
is low). As a result it takes long time to improve self-image for an individual with low
mean and variance. The reason is that such an individual is likely to chose options
resulting in weak signals of ability in case of success.
325 Concluding discussion
We have studied the eﬀects of ability uncertainty on career choices and shown that
several labor market phenomena can be explained by our model of educational and
occupational choices under ability uncertainty and Bayesian updating.
We have taken diﬀerences in self-percetion as our starting point. Trying to under-
stand the emergence of group diﬀerences in perceptions of self is a natural continua-
tion. Absence of role models - individuals who can serve as points of reference when
the individual forms his perception of self, is one possible story.21 Another example
of informational role-models is present in Chung (2000).22
This paper has emphasized the adverse consequences of being trapped and re-
maining ignorant, but, of course, the outside option can be both curse and blessing.
If the outside option is lucrative enough, why force yourself through pain,sweat and
hard work in a PhD program, when investment banking is really your mission in
life. On the other hand, if the presence of an outside option - be it in the form of
a high minimum wage, a generous welfare system or a safe future taking over the
family trade - discourages you from exploiting your comparative advantage it can be
ac o s t l yt r a p .
A relevant issue is how to solve problems of negative self-selection that arises
from lack of conﬁdence. One obvious solution is to increase and improve the signals
individuals get on their ability at early stages in their career. The problem is, of
course, how this can be done.
Clearly, some abilities are costly to reveal - typically those that require large
21We investigate this route in Sjögren and Sällström (2004)
22In Chung the emphasis lies on the role-model as a provider of information on the returns to
eﬀort in pursuing a career path where individuals know their own ability, but cannot distinguish
whether others have failed as a result of insuﬃcient ability or eﬀort.
33human capital investments. Some are more readily spotted - like beauty, soccer etc.
Little surprise, talent scouts are typically found in areas requiring such easily revealed
talents and where the talent scouts can extract rents because they have superior
information on what it takes to be successful. Furthermore, some abilities need to be
revealed early in life in order to have a chance to pay oﬀ - e.g. ballet, gymnastics or
tennis. Other talents can be productive also late in life. This may explain why some
parents encourage their young children to spend much time and eﬀort nourishing and
experimenting in order to reveal such ”perishable” talents. Academic talents can wait
- at least in some societies.
School is, of course, an important experimental arena for revealing certain abilities
- apart from providing valuable general skills. The sociological literature provides
evidence that extended compulsory schooling increases social mobility.23 That more
students from disadvantaged educational background opt for higher education seems
to be evidence that more academic talents are revealed, which is supportive of our
model. A problem arises, however, when schools do not provide signals or when
the signals given to children are too weak and erroneous. We show in Sjögren and
Sällström (2004b) that the costs of no signals can be higher than the costs of strong,
but biased signals, especially in the tails of the ability distribution.
However, the structure of wages, has perhaps the largest inﬂuence on which talents
it is worth spending time to reveal - either in school, in the basement with the guitar,
in front of the computer hacking away or on the soccer ﬁeld. If returns to education
are low and if schools provide poor signals - the talents worth experimenting to reveal
are likely to be other than academic talents.
23See also Meghir and Palme (1999).
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A Appendix
A.1 Description of UGU 1953 -Data24
Total sample 9408 individuals on which there is information om verbal ability from
UGU53 cohort, which is a representative sample of about 10% of all individuals born
in Sweden in 1953, are selected. Of these a sub-sample of individuals, 659 men and
601 women, have completed at least 3 years of university education. Out of these 1260
we have detailed information on highest degree completed and age at graduation for
a sub-sample containing 981 individuals, 504 men and 477. The degrees (3-digit SUN
codes) of these 981 individuals have been categorized into male and female dominated
ﬁelds based on the ratio of men to women in UGU48 data set. The reason for using
the UGU48 proportions of male to female is that choices are typically inﬂuenced on
the information available prior to entering university. Another argument is that we
want to avoid exaggeration of the delay eﬀects by putting too much emphasis on those
who enter an education late precisely because this education is under rapid change
in its male female ratio. E.g. if the ban on female priests is suddenly lifted, it is not
strange if, initially, female priest graduates are older than male.
24See also the information and code books available on http://www.ssd.gu.se/kid/indexval.html.
38N obs Male Male 
Sun code Education Cohort-53 Proportion Dominated
Cohort-53 Cohort-48
Art and Humanities
160 general 37 0.68 1
164 librarian 15 0.33 0
166 humanities 26 0.42 0
170 PhD arts 2 1.00 1
Education
260 Child Ped 78 0.04 0
261 Primary School Teacher 98 0.32 0
263 Special Teacher 20 0.35 0
264 Tech/Home Econ Teacher 35 0.23 0
267 Sen. High Teacher 47 0.62 0
268 Higher Ped Educ 25 0.26 0
269 Other Ped educ 34 0.56 1
Social Science
360 Journalism 13 0.38 1
362 Business 104 0.76 1
363 Behavioral/Psychology 137 0.32 0
364 Law 56 0.55 1
365 Master of Politics 1 1.00 1
366 Social Science Degree 50 0.47 1
370 PhD Social Science 29 0.59 0
Science
460 general 48 0.71 1
464 Civil engineer/architecture 165 0.88 1
470 PhD Science 26 0.81 1
Transport
560 general 13 0.92 1
Medical
660 Med Lic 81 0.58 1
662 Dentist 35 0.54 1
663 Physiotherapy 5 0.00 0
666 Adv Nurse 47 0.02 0
669 Other med 14 0.36 1
670 Med Dr 11 0.64 1
Agriculture
760 general 10 0.30 1
Military
860 general 17 1.00 1
866 Special Officer 24 1.00 1
Other University Education




THG: three year theoretical university preparing highshool program
Minimum ability test score takes on values from 1 to 40. The distribution of
the minimum of each individual’s standardized test scores (from the verbal, spacial
and logical tests) is divided into 40 quantiles. The individual is assigned the test
39score corresponding to his position in the distribution.
A.3 Stubborn self-image and behavior
A.3.1 Lemma 2
Success in C1 gives Perseveria an updated prior
ρ1P|s in C1 =
ac16(a − a2)
R 1
0 ac16(a − a2)da





Perseveria’s self-image is hence:
Z 1
0











which is Rationella’s self-image after success in C1. Failure in C1 gives Perseveria an
updated prior:
ρ1P|f in C1 =
(1 − ac1)6(a − a2)
R 1





2¢ (c1 +3 )( 2+c1)
c1(5 + c1)
. (23)
Perseveria’s self-image is then:
Z 1
0
aρ1P|f in C1da =
c2
1 +9 c1 +1 4
2(9c1 + c2












which is the self-image of Rationella’s after failure in C1. Hence, success (and failure)
has smaller positive (negative) eﬀect on Perseveria’s self-image than on Rationella’s.
A.3.2 Proposition 5













1 +5 c1+6 )
(c1 + c2 +3 )( c1 + c2 +2 )
=
hO2(c2 +1 )( c2
1 +5 c1+6 )
(c1 + c2 +3 )( c1 + c2 +2 )
.
40Hence, Perseveria’s expected productivity is not necessarily increasing in C2,a si s
Rationella’s, which can be veriﬁed by taking the derivative of expected productivity













This derivative is clearly negative if c2 is large relative to c1, implying that there are
possible values of r2 and m1, m2 such that M2 is the preferred option.















hO2(c2 +1 )( c1 +3 )( c1 +2 )( c1 +2 c2 +5 )
(c2 +2 )( c2 +3 )( c1 +5 )( c1 + c2 +2 )( c1 + c2 +3 )
.
The derivative of EP[HC2 | C1] with respect to c2 can be shown to be positive for
small c2 when c1 is very large.
If r1 = r2 and m1 = m2,E P[HM2 | sM1] R EP[HR2 | sM1] if
hO2(m +1 )( m2 +5 m +6 )
(m + m +3 )( m + m +2 )
R
hO2(r +1 )( m2 +5 m +6 )
(m + r +3 )( m + r +2 )
ie if
r R m +1 .
Furthermore, it can be shown that EP[HM2 | fR1] >E P[HR2 | fR1] and that there
exits an r(m) that solves EP[HM2 | fR1]=EP[HO2 | fR1]. This r(m) is shown in
ﬁgure 10.
Given that Perseveria behaves optimally at t =2 ,h e rﬁrst period problem is to
choose C1 to maximize pay-oﬀ:
41E[HC1]=
6


















2 are the optimal choice at t =2given success and failure in C1 at
t =1 .
T h es o l u t i o n st ot h ee q u a t i o n sE[HR1]=E[HM1] and E[HM1]=E[HO1], given
optimal behaviour at t =2are shown as the thick black lines in Figure 11 for hO1 =
hO2 =1 , and for hO1 =1 , and hO2 =1 .5. It is clear that there exist (m,r) such
that Rationella and Perseveria make the same t =1choice, but make diﬀerent t =2
choices even if they receive the same (weak) signal.
42